War Debate Guide

From PhiloWiki

Contents 1 Nature of war 2 Cataclysmic school of thought 3 Eschatological school of thought 4 Political school of thought 5 Just war 6 Conduct of war 7 Contemporary 8 References

Nature of war

Most philosophers who have written on war have provided singular explanations of why we wage war: they blame the environment, our genes, culture, technology, or even our reason. In other words, they claim that man cannot stop war – it is in his nature to wage war. On the other hand, political writers on the subject enjoy describing and fleshing out the details of balance of power theories and try to avoid philosophical thinking; yet these too employ the philosophical argument that war is inevitable or that conflict is innate in human affairs, and the best we can do is to maneuver ourselves politically and militarily into a dominant or protected position...

The moral goal for humanity is to become more reasonable and to renounce violence. However, I argue that the gains of the Age of Enlightenment and of philosophical rationalism are relatively vulnerable: they are culturally shallow in comparison to the grand ideologies of war that we inherit and pass on. Only where the free market has developed and advanced unhampered by intervention do we see a reduction in men’s latent desires to conquer and kill. But even in the West, it does not take much to stir atavistic dreams of revenge and to encourage men to turn their backs on peace in favor of war.

A philosophy of war from LewRockwell.com  Alexander Moseley

• What is war? How can it be defined?
• What causes war?
• What is the relationship between human nature and war? To what extent can humans be said to be responsible for war?

Cataclysmic school of thought

This school, which was espoused by Leo Tolstoy in his epic novel War and Peace, sees war as a bane on humanity--whether avoidable or inevitable--which serves little purpose outside of causing destruction and suffering, and which may cause drastic change to society, but not in any teleological sense. Tolstoy's view may be placed under the subcategory of global cataclysmic philosophy of war. Another subcategory of the cataclysmic school of thought is the ethnocentric cataclysmic, in which this view is focused specifically on the plight of a specific ethnicity or nation, for example the view in Judaism of war as a punishment from God on the Israelites in certain books of the Tenakh (Old Testament). As the Tenakh sees war as an ineluctable act of God, so Tolstoy especially emphasizes war as something that befalls man and is in no way under the influence of man's "free will", but is instead the result of irresistible global forces. (On War, Rapoport's introduction 16)

Cataclysmic school of thought from Wikipedia

Eschatological school of thought

This school sees all wars (or all major wars) as leading to some goal, and asserts that some final conflict will someday resolve the path followed by all wars and result in a massive upheaval of society and a subsequent new society free from war (in varying theories the resulting society may be either a utopia or a dystopia). There are two subsets of this view: the Messianic and the Global theory. The Marxist concept of a communist world ruled by the proletariat after a final worldwide revolution is an example of the global theory, and the Christian concept of an Armageddon war which will usher in the second coming of Christ and the final defeat of Satan is an example of a theory that could fall under Global or Messianic. (On War, Rapoport's introduction, 15) The messianic eschatological philosophy is derived from the Jewish-Christian concept of a Messiah, and sees wars as culminating in unification of humanity under a single faith or a single ruler. Crusades, Jihads, the Nazi concept of a Master Race and the 19th century American concept of Manifest Destiny may also fall under this heading. (On War, Rapoport's introduction, 15) (See main articles for more information: Christian eschatology, Jewish eschatology)

Eschatological school of thought from Wikipedia

Political school of thought

This school, of which Clausewitz was a proponent, sees war as a tool of the state. On page 13 Rapoport says,

Clausewitz views war as a rational instrument of national policy. The three words "rational", "instrument" and "national" are the key concepts of his paradigm. In this view, the decision to wage war "ought" to be rational, in the sense that it ought to be based on estimated costs and gains of war. Next, war "ought" to be instrumental, in the sense that it ought to be waged in order to achieve some goal, never for its own sake; and also in the sense that strategy and tactics ought to be directed towards just one end, namely towards victory. Finally, war "ought" to be national, in the sense that its objective should be to advance the interests of a national state and that the entire effort of the nation ought to be mobilized in the service of the military objective.

Political school of thought from Wikipedia

Just war

1. Just cause. This is clearly the most important rule; it sets the tone for everything which follows. A state may launch a war only for the right reason. The just causes most frequently mentioned include: self-defence from external attack; the defence of others from such; the protection of innocents from brutal, aggressive regimes; and punishment for a grievous wrongdoing which remains uncorrected. Vitoria suggested that all the just causes be subsumed under the one category of “a wrong received.” Walzer, and most modern just war theorists, speak of the one just cause for resorting to war being the resistance of aggression. Aggression is the use of armed force in violation of someone else's basic rights.
2. Right intention. A state must intend to fight the war only for the sake of its just cause. Having the right reason for launching a war is not enough: the actual motivation behind the resort to war must also be morally appropriate. Ulterior motives, such as a power or land grab, or irrational motives, such as revenge or ethnic hatred, are ruled out. The only right intention allowed is to see the just cause for resorting to war secured and consolidated. If another intention crowds in, moral corruption sets in. International law does not include this rule, probably because of the evidentiary difficulties involved in determining a state's intent.
3. Proper authority and public declaration. A state may go to war only if the decision has been made by the appropriate authorities, according to the proper process, and made public, notably to its own citizens and to the enemy state(s). The “appropriate authority” is usually specified in that country's constitution. States failing the requirements of minimal justice lack the legitimacy to go to war.
4. Last Resort. A state may resort to war only if it has exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives to resolving the conflict in question, in particular diplomatic negotiation. One wants to make sure something as momentous and serious as war is declared only when it seems the last practical and reasonable shot at effectively resisting aggression.
5. Probability of Success. A state may not resort to war if it can foresee that doing so will have no measurable impact on the situation. The aim here is to block mass violence which is going to be futile. International law does not include this requirement, as it is seen as biased against small, weaker states.
6. Proportionality. A state must, prior to initiating a war, weigh the universal goods expected to result from it, such as securing the just cause, against the universal evils expected to result, notably casualties. Only if the benefits are proportional to, or “worth”, the costs may the war action proceed. (The universal must be stressed, since often in war states only tally their own expected benefits and costs, radically discounting those accruing to the enemy and to any innocent third parties.)

War from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Critics of Israel’s performance in the Hezbollah War argue their attacks are not “proportionate” because more Lebanese have died than Israelis. This twisted use of the concept of proportionality is philosophically juvenile, morally repugnant, historically hypocritical, ignorant of reality and militarily vacuous.

Proportionality is a tenet of traditional just-war theory, but it bears no resemblance to the comparative body counts now in vogue. Rather, it refers to the relationship between the threat faced and the force employed.

In the words of philosopher Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Proportionality refers to the need to use the level of force commensurate with the nature of the threat.” Using nuclear weapons to stop two soldiers carrying machine guns would be disproportionate...

Put differently, if Hezbollah killed 50 Israelis and the Israel Defense Forces rounded up and killed 50 Lebanese, the response would be proportionate but barbaric. The justice of a war is not a mathematical function of each side’s causalities.

Indeed, this caricature of the just-war concept of proportionality is historically novel. The Japanese killed 68 American civilians at Pearl Harbor. In the course of World War II, we killed 600,000 Japanese civilians. It was the level of threat posed by Japan, not the number of civilian deaths they caused, that justified full-scale war by the United States. If the quarter of a million Israelis living in bomb shelters had made themselves easier targets by coming out into the open, would Israeli military action then be justified?

The case against proportionality from The Hill  Mark Mellman

• Is it ever right to wage war?
• Should certain acts of war be impermissible?
• What should be the legitimate authority to declare war?
• What is the individual's moral and political relationship to his comrades or countrymen in arms?

Conduct of war

1. Obey all international laws on weapons prohibition. Chemical and biological weapons, in particular, are forbidden by many treaties. Nuclear weapons aren't so clearly prohibited but it seems fair to say a huge taboo attaches to such weapons and any use of them would be greeted with incredible hostility by the international community.
2. Discrimination and Non-Combatant Immunity. Soldiers are only entitled to use their (non-prohibited) weapons to target those who are, in Walzer's words, “engaged in harm.” Thus, when they take aim, soldiers must discriminate between the civilian population, which is morally immune from direct and intentional attack, and those legitimate military, political and industrial targets involved in rights-violating harm. While some collateral civilian casualties are excusable, it is wrong to take deliberate aim at civilian targets. An example would be saturation bombing of residential areas. (It is worth noting that almost all wars since 1900 have featured larger civilian, than military, casualties. Perhaps this is one reason why this rule is the most frequently and stridently codified rule in all the laws of armed conflict, as international law seeks to protect unarmed civilians as best it can.)
3. Proportionality. Soldiers may only use force proportional to the end they seek. They must restrain their force to that amount appropriate to achieving their aim or target. Weapons of mass destruction, for example, are usually seen as being out of proportion to legitimate military ends.
4. Benevolent quarantine for prisoners of war (POWs). If enemy soldiers surrender and become captives, they cease being lethal threats to basic rights. They are no longer “engaged in harm.” Thus it is wrong to target them with death, starvation, rape, torture, medical experimentation, and so on. They are to be provided, as The Geneva Conventions spell out, with benevolent—not malevolent—quarantine away from battle zones and until the war ends, when they should be exchanged for one's own POWs. Do terrorists deserve such protection, too? Great controversy surrounds the detainment and aggressive questioning of terrorist suspects held by the U.S. at jails in Cuba, Iraq and Pakistan in the name of the war on terror.
5. No Means Mala in Se. Soldiers may not use weapons or methods which are “evil in themselves.” These include: mass rape campaigns; genocide or ethnic cleansing; using poison or treachery (like disguising soldiers to look like the Red Cross); forcing captured soldiers to fight against their own side; and using weapons whose effects cannot be controlled, like biological agents.
6. No reprisals. A reprisal is when country A violates jus in bello in war with country B. Country B then retaliates with its own violation of jus in bello, seeking to chasten A into obeying the rules. There are strong moral and evidentiary reasons to believe that reprisals don't work, and they instead serve to escalate death and make the destruction of war increasingly indiscriminate. Winning well is the best revenge.

War from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The world’s media are once again filtering warfare through their idiosyncratic perspectives. Most of them are shocked to discover that civilians are injured when terrorists locate military facilities in apartment houses, mosques, and other civilian locales. And they are doubly outraged when a missile or a shell goes off course injuring or killing innocents...

1. When you attack a country that is at peace, you are the aggressor. Aggression is a disruption of the civil order. It is not measured solely in the quantitative terms of the specific engagement. For instance, the significance of Pearl Harbor did not reside in the specific number of bombs the Japanese dropped on our ships. It also resided in the alteration of the relations between the two countries by force. It called forth a response on the part of the U.S. that was not, and was not intended to be, proportional to that attack. The response it called forth was to establish under whose power the citizens of each country were going to live.
2. In the Israel/Hizbullah War, Hizbullah is the aggressor. Israel was at peace with its neighboring country Lebanon. Out of the territory of Lebanon, Hizbullah undertook acts of war. Like the Japanese, they did not declare war, they undertook war.
3. Once war is initiated, then the question is not proportionality, but victory. The question to be decided is under whose power are the citizens of each country going to live?
4. The policy of the U.S. toward countries that attempt to bring our citizens under their power is “unconditional surrender.” This means that the U.S. expects to deliver to our enemy as much devastation in as compressed a timeframe as possible until the leadership of the country surrenders unconditionally to our power. That determines under whose power the citizens of each country are going to live: ours.
5. In the case of the Israel/Hizbullah War, the question is whether Israel will live under the power of Hizbullah or whether Hizbullah is going to live under the power of Israel. In that sense, whatever the vocabulary, Israel is now fighting for the unconditional surrender of Hizbullah, or what amounts to the same thing, its complete destruction. We can expect that Israel will deliver the maximum amount of damage against Hizbullah of which it is capable in as compressed a timeframe as possible...
6. During this period there is going to be violence. That is what war means. You can photograph it from every conceivable angle, and document every casualty. That does not change the fact that there is an aggressor – Hizbullah – and a defender – Israel. The end game of war is when the defender goes on the offensive to destroy the aggressor. The final stage of a war is when the defender appears to be the aggressor as it moves into the territory of the aggressor and burns out its black heart. That will be the final stage of the war. Then there will be peace.
7. All recent history shows that there is no role for a “peacekeeping” force in a situation of military antagonism. The oldest of illusions is that the “presence” of a third force will in some way provide a deterrent factor – wrong. Wrong when there was a UN force in Sinai before the 1967 War. Wrong when we put Marines in Lebanon in 1983. Wrong when we put unsupported troops in Mogadishu. Wrong when whatever grotesquely ineffective force was put in southern Lebanon by the UN defaulted on its duty. Why? Because the peacekeeping force is not playing for keeps while the aggressor is. So it cannot work. The only solution is the destruction of the aggressor. Otherwise the logic of the aggressor is to keep up the aggression. The aggressor doesn’t want peace, he wants victory. The only way to block that is to inflict defeat on him. There is no third way.

A Few of the Basics of War from The American Thinker  Greg Richards

Contemporary

The Middle East peace will be achieved when one of the following things happen-and not until-

1. Out of the goodness of their hearts, the Israeli's concede they have no right to exist and vacate the territory.
2. Out of the goodness of their hearts, the Arabs concede Israel's right to exist within safe and secure borders and then stop attacking them.
3. Someone's a$$ is kicked so badly in a huge war that the loser has to follow 1 or 2 above.

The Israeli-Hezbollah War from Free Republic

References

Perhaps the greatest and most influential works in the philosophy of war are The Art of War by Sun Tzu, Arthashastra by Chanakya and On War by Carl von Clausewitz. Each book combines observations on strategy with questions about human nature and the purpose of war. Clausewitz especially examines the teleology of war: whether war is a means to an end outside itself or whether it can be an end in itself. He concludes that the latter cannot be so, and that war is "politics by different means"; i.e. that war must not exist only for its own sake but must serve some purpose for the state.

Leo Tolstoy's novel War and Peace contains frequent philosophical digressions on the philosophy of war (and broader metaphysical assertions derived from Tolstoy's observations of the Napoleonic Wars), and was very influential on later thought about war. Tolstoy's thought was a big influence on Gandhi's non-violent resistance philosophy.

Niccolò Machiavelli wrote a book titled The Art of War, however its focus is mostly on weaponry and strategy instead of philosophy. However, sections of his masterpiece The Prince discuss war from a philosophical point of view.

References from Wikipedia